WASHINGTON – If terrorists were to explode a nuclear weapon, the United States does not have the capabilities in place to identify the source of the weapon or to respond sufficiently to such a disaster, according to a report on counterterrorism released yesterday by the National Academy of Sciences.
The report, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, estimates that the country is several years away from having the capability to detect a nuclear weaponís country of origin.
ěThe technology for developing this capability exists but needs to be assembled, an effort that is expected to take several years,î the report says.
If true, that fact could impair short-term deterrence of nuclear weapons terrorism, allowing terrorists – and governments that might aid them – to determine that they could escape U.S. retaliation, according to the report.
The credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence ěwould depend in large part on the ability of the United States to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it has the technical means to attribute such attacks to states or terror groups,î the report says.
It notes two basic challenges to identifying the source of a nuclear weapon: determining the characteristics of the specific weapon and matching those data to information known about nuclear weapons around the world.
ěThe former can be determined through careful analysis of blast debris; the latter might be determined by linking this information with intelligence on thefts, smuggling, and weapons development efforts by states and terror groups developed through the data-mining techniques discussed above.î
U.S. national laboratories currently are working on developing an attribution capability through the Pentagonís Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the report says. It stresses that the existence of such a technical capability should be demonstrated and widely known. The work should continue ěto declared operability as quickly as possible,î it says.
In a footnote, the reportís authors acknowledged that the doctrine of assured retaliation ěprobably would not deterî fanatical terrorist groups, but, they added, it may discourage states from providing such groups with assistance.
The reportís conclusion and recommendations, many related to improving U.S. security against nuclear and radiological terrorism, may fly in the face of conventional wisdom.
In the movie The Sum of All Fears, based on a Tom Clancy novel and released nationwide May 31, U.S. experts were able to analyze very quickly – seemingly in hours – the debris of a nuclear blast in Baltimore to identify the source of the weaponís fissile material.
Much of the necessary technology is already available, left over from the days when the United States was evaluating atmospheric nuclear tests, said William Happer, a physics professor at Princeton and the chairman of the committee that produced the nuclear and radiological threat section of the report.
ěThere is a limited amount of technology that we have left over from the days of atmospheric testing, where we tried to analyze fallout to infer the properties of the weapons,î he said. ěAnd that of course has essentially atrophied since we went to underground testing.î
Happer said if the United States, with a serious effort, could assemble a capability in as short as a month.
ěIt would be nice to have a team of people ready if necessary, to learn what you could from the debris,î he said.
The report says the United States has no evidence that a terrorist organization or non-nuclear state possesses stolen nuclear weapons, but that situation ěcould change rapidly over the near termî without steps to better secure former Soviet materials.
Updated Response Plan Needed
The report also recommends updating the U.S. Federal Emergency Response Plan, concluding it does not adequately address national needs in the event of a nuclear or radiological weapons attack on a U.S. city.
Published in 1996, the plan establishes authorities and procedures for responding to ěpeacetimeî radiological emergencies such as accidents at nuclear power plants. It devotes just three paragraphs to radiological sabotage and terrorism, the report says. The plan designates the FBI as the lead investigative agency and requires other agencies to support the bureau.
ěThereís not much there, and that I think is an accurate statement about the level of planning weíve got right now,î said Happer.
ěA terrorist attack could be much larger in magnitude than other events anticipated under the emergency plan,î the report says.
The proper response to a nuclear weapon attack, the report says, would require:
* large numbers of rescuers and medical personnel trained to deal with radiological emergencies, as well as a plan for mobilizing medical resources nationwide;
* the ability to manage large populations in contaminated urban areas for long periods of time, potentially years, as well as a capability to airlift of field hospitals rapidly;
* the ability to predict in real time the spread of radioactive debris clouds and provide information to potentially affected populations so that appropriate actions can be taken; and
* timely and effective cleanup capabilities, such as procedures for decontaminating people, land and buildings.
ěThe current plan does not appear to provide guidance needed to ensure this type of response in the case of nuclear terrorist attack,î the report said, recommending ěimmediateî steps to amend the plan or create a separate one.
If somebody were to set off a nuclear weapon in New York, Washington or Chicago, said Happer, ěthere would be hundreds of thousands of casualtiesî immediately. In addition, local medical facilities would probably be damaged, requiring outside medical aid to be flown in to assist the survivors.
ěWhat we need distributed across the country are people who would be prepared to move very quickly, to be air-lifted into the neighborhood and start to help,î he said, as well as designated resources and training.
Other Recommendations
The report also recommends:
* an increase in research and development to improve the technological capabilities of special nuclear material detection systems for detecting highly enriched uranium;
* a national detection network using a variety of sensors at strategic choke points to prevent smuggling of nuclear materials into the country;
* a reexamination, through the departments of Defense and Energy, of the security of U.S. nuclear weapons within U.S. borders and elsewhere, though such weapons represent a ěvery small threatî;
* an evaluation of the risks and benefits of basing U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries and elsewhere abroad;
* an evaluation of ways to speed the safeguarding of Russian nuclear weapons and weapon-grade fissile materials; and
* an increase to the priority and pace of blending down Russian highly enriched uranium to lower purity, a quick solution to take away the weapons capability.
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