Executive Summary
Washington's interest in developing new nuclear weapons has gathered pace since the arrival of President George W. Bush's administration in January 2001. This pursuit in turn forms part of a wider reorientation of US nuclear policy that seeks to increase the relevance of nuclear weapons in US military planning and boost the credibility behind the threat of their use.
The NPR Sets the Scene
The release of the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in January 2002 capped a year of discussion and debate within the Bush administration about the required size and role of the US nuclear arsenal. The NPR calls for a "New Triad", comprised of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defences, and a revitalised defence infrastructure. It also recommends reducing the operationally-deployed nuclear force to 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012, but retains a "responsive nuclear force" as part of the active stockpile to be uploaded within days, weeks or months as a guard against "potential contingencies." Finally, the NPR recommends that the United States develop weapons to destroy hardened and deeply-buried targets (HDBTs), considered a key unmet capability in US defence.
Defeating HDBTs has stirred up great debate in Washington and beyond because the Pentagon is interested in developing not only improved conventional capabilities, but also new or modified nuclear weapons to fulfil the mission. Since current US conventional weapons may not be able to achieve the complete destruction of HDBTs, the NPR supports the further development of US nuclear capabilities. To carry out this mission, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has established advanced concept teams at the US nuclear weapons laboratories to proceed with research into improved earth penetrating weapons. In addition, the NPR also calls for a feasibility study to be performed on modifying an existing nuclear warhead. While public discussion of nuclear weapons in the Bush administration has remained confined to development of earth penetrating weapons, Washington has not left behind the "mini-nuke" in its plans for the future. A mini-nuke, with a yield of five kilotons or less, probably would require a completely new warhead design.
A More Aggressive Policy
The Pentagon's interest in new nuclear capabilities raises additional concerns about a possible US return to nuclear testing. While the Bush administration may stand by the current moratorium on nuclear testing, deploying a new nuclear weapon design with a low yield would require testing to ensure the integrity of the new warhead. Efforts have already been made in Congress to secure funding to reduce the time needed for test site readiness, but those attempts have been stymied thus far.
The proposals included in the NPR reflect the Pentagon's effort to enhance the credibility of the threat to use its nuclear weapons. Previously, Washington pursued a policy of deliberate ambiguity over the question of whether it is prepared to counter a chemical or biological weapons attack with nuclear weapons. Hawkish policy officials believe that the United States should now adopt a more explicit stance in this regard and thereby raise the profile of its nuclear arsenal in its military planning. The Bush administration already has started down this road by announcing that a pre-emptive strike policy would be incorporated into the National Security Strategy in autumn 2002.
US congressional oversight of funding will play a large role in the development of these initiatives. During the current session of Congress, achieving consensus between both the House and the Senate will be a greater challenge for the President than in previous years. The volatile issue of creating new nuclear weapons probably will spur great debate as the two chambers jointly consider fiscal bills in the autumn. Congressional elections in November 2002 may also sharply affect the progress of the Bush administration's implementation of the NPR's recommendations. With narrow margins between Republicans and Democrats in both chambers, no roadmap for future funding of these initiatives will be known until after the elections. However, the anticipated narrow majorities in both legislative bodies promises to keep these issues in contentious debate over the coming years.
Past as Prologue
A brief look at US nuclear policy during the 1990s shows that the development of new nuclear weapons is not a new concept. Military planners have sought new missions for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world, while growing concerns about the spread of underground bunkers has provided the weapons laboratories with sufficient reasons to develop new weapons.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new rapprochement between East and West, many policy analysts in the early 1990s looked forward to an era in which nuclear weapons would play an ever-diminishing role in US military policy. In the background, however, pro-nuclear lobbyists were promoting new tasks for existing nuclear forces, arguing that they should play a key role in countering "regional threats" and endorsing the development of new non-strategic nuclear weapons. These arguments were bolstered by the perception of the growing risk from WMD armed "rogue states". By 1996, it was clear that these arguments had been fed into policy when William Perry, US defence secretary, confirmed that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a chemical weapons attack. In 1997, a leaked, classified presidential document showed that the scope of nuclear targeting had been widened to include "rogue states" as well as China.
These efforts were instrumental during the 1990s as the United States became increasingly concerned with the development of underground bunkers by potential adversaries. The US government's perception of the threat posed by these facilities has been spurred by the activities of a number of countries it views as hostile, including Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Afghanistan. Defeat of HDBTs rapidly emerged as the mission most likely to justify the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War environment. In 1997, US nuclear weapons laboratories succeeded in obtaining funds for the development of the B61-11, a modified nuclear weapon for use against HDBTs and the first new nuclear capability added to the US arsenal since 1989. However, subsequent tests showed that the B61-11 could only penetrate about 6 metres (20 feet) into dry earth when dropped from 12,200 metres (40,000 feet), making it ineffective against deeply buried bunkers.
Through a variety of study groups and projects, the question of new nuclear weapons for targeting HDBTs remained on the agenda throughout the 1990s. Despite the debut of the B61-11 and a prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapon development, the defeat of HDBTs continued to provide the most likely justification for new nuclear weapons. The NPR realised many of these long-held nuclear aspirations.
Increasing Transatlantic Tension
The NPR's recommendations will affect more than just US planning. Allies and adversaries alike have reacted to the new US nuclear posture with trepidation, wariness, and even anger. Many countries took issue with the new "hit list" of possible US nuclear force targets that included states without nuclear weapons. Countries targeted by the new policy also voiced their disagreement, and may even choose to respond to the policy shift with their own strategy or deployment changes.
NATO allies will be especially affected by the change in US policy. NATO nuclear policy must at all times be in broad agreement with US nuclear policy to avoid any internal contradiction. The United States therefore holds an effective veto over the development of NATO nuclear policy. Washington may seek to include similar language in future alliance policy documents to extend the range of missions for its nuclear arsenal, despite concern expressed by NATO allies. Already strained by questions over its role in a post-September 11 world, NATO will have difficulty withstanding fresh splits over this issue.
The shift in US policy also raises a number of questions for the UK government, whose nuclear doctrine is closely aligned with that of the United States through NATO. Britain may be forced to modify its doctrine in order to give political cover to Washington, and the government has already hinted at such a shift. From its remarks, the UK government seems broadly in agreement with US policy. However, while London may feel safe in matching Washington on questions of first-use and targeting non-nuclear states in response to a CBW attack, it has long sought to distance itself from the idea of using low-yield warheads to target HDBTs. Additionally, the UK government would be placed in an awkward position should Washington withdraw its signature from the CTBT. Any movement away from the current US testing moratorium would present difficulties for Prime Minister Tony Blair in an area where the UK government is still prepared to argue against Washington's policies.
Arms Control Under Threat
The Bush administration's nuclear policy proposals also have implications for the interlocking matrix of global arms control agreements, showing that Washington's plans will have a far-reaching impact. US policy planners hope to deal with the deterrence needs of the modern world by improving flexibility in its offensive and defensive capabilities. These developments pose grave threats to the global arms control architecture that has taken years to put in place.
Of all the international regimes to be affected by the NPR, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) may suffer the greatest blow. While the Bush administration professes to uphold the broad structure of the NPT, its plans contradict some of the 13 steps to advance the treaty agreed by all states parties in May 2000. Ongoing attempts to develop new, more usable nuclear weapons, and a refusal to rule out their use against non-nuclear states, raises serious doubts about Washington's commitment to ensure "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies". The threat to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state runs contrary to the "negative security assurances" issued by the nuclear powers in the context of the NPT regime. Plans for new missile systems, submarines, and bombers demonstrate the Bush administration's ambition to continue, and possibly increase, the reliance on nuclear weapons in US military planning well into the 21st century.
Another treaty regime that is placed in greater jeopardy by the creation of new nuclear weapons is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Development of new warheads could necessitate renewed testing, with the administration claiming that the safety and reliability of the new designs cannot be derived from the results of previous testing. Upholding the test-ban moratorium while refusing to pursue ratification of the CTBT has been the Bush administration's long-standing position. However, the NPR asserts that maintaining the test-ban moratorium "may not be possible for the indefinite future". By refusing to send a representative to attend a CTBT entry-into-force meeting, and threatening to withhold contributions to the CTBT secretariat, Washington seems willing to undermine the treaty.
Increasing Regional Tensions
As well as weakening global regimes, the Bush administration's nuclear proposals will have considerable bilateral and regional consequences. In Russia, a move to develop new nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be portrayed as a failure for Putin's pro-Western policy and confirmation that the United States, while talking friendship, is working against Russian interests. Any development of new nuclear weapons by the United States could increase the Russian military's interest in maintaining and developing its own nuclear arsenal, despite Putin's efforts in recent years to steer the Russian military away from such a path of nuclear reliance. With renewed emphasis on nuclear arsenals and technologies in both Russia and the United States, the possibility of meaningful reductions in tactical nuclear weapons will disappear rapidly.
The development of low yield nuclear weapons would appear to Chinese analysts and policymakers as further proof of US hostility. The NPR highlights "a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan" as a clear example of a potential nuclear flashpoint with China. At the same time, the NPR's New Triad seems ideally designed to nullify Beijing's nuclear deterrent and could allow the United States to call China's bluff in a future confrontation over Taiwan. Consequently, China would be able to justify expanding its nuclear arsenal without eliciting strong international reaction. This stance may have serious impact on stability in South Asia as India and Pakistan seek to maintain the regional military balance.
Washington's plans also have "rogue states" very much in mind, which risks destroying the diplomatic progress that has been made with many of these countries. The NPR's plans seriously threaten areas of progress that have been strongly supported by European allies. Dialogue has all but disappeared, and the incentives for "rogue states" to remain engaged with the international community seem to be rapidly shrinking. For example, the policies of the United States towards Iran contrast strongly with the "constructive engagement" pursued by the EU and Britain, which have re-established diplomatic relations with Iran and encouraged democratisation.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pressure in several key areas is necessary in order to move Washington policymaking away from an aggressive, unilateralist posture and to sustain existing non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
Immediate steps to prevent the development and testing of new weapons include the following:
Congress must withhold funding for research and development.
European parliamentarians should be in contact with counterparts in the US Congress.
European governments should reaffirm their opposition to nuclear testing.
Britain must take the lead on restraining US plans.
To strengthen existing arms control mechanisms:
US Congress must direct more funds toward constructive engagement initiatives with the international community.
European governments must strive to implement the May 2000 NPT Plan of Action.
Nuclear weapon states must reiterate and uphold negative security assurances.
As a close ally to the United States, the UK government should restate its own negative security assurances in the strongest language possible.
Washington and Moscow should agree on a treaty to reduce their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.
European leaders should support continued US-Russian dialogues on nuclear reductions.
European governments must step up Co-operative Threat Reduction support for Russia.
To address challenges from "states of concern":
Countries should enhance international efforts to identify and inspect underground facilities.
The United States and its European allies must reach out to bring isolated states into arms control regimes and ensure their compliance.
The UK government should renew its commitment to pursue a legally binding treaty on negative security assurances.
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