During the past couple of days, some repercussions relating to Marwan al-Barghuthi nominating himself as a candidate in the presidential elections have been interacting, sometimes on a narrow and secret scope, and at other times on a public scope. Private sources inside the Al-Aqsa Brigades have confirmed to Al-Quds al-Arabi that pressures are increasing on Al-Barghuthi to make the decision to publicly retract his nomination. They pointed out that these pressures no longer take the shape of media and public stances only, but have started becoming stronger and tighter inside the organizational frameworks, particularly on the central personal joints of the Al-Aqsa Brigades' body.
At the same time, during the past two days, some sharp polarization and comprehensive review has been taking place inside the Al-Aqsa Brigades regarding the entire scene relating to Al-Barghuthi. Some new developments have emerged that have realized a few negative effects on those applying pressure on the Al-Aqsa Brigades. Among those pressures was the increasing enthusiasm inside the leadership frameworks in the body of the Brigades, to challenge the generation controlling the Fatah leadership from abroad, and apply pressure in two directions. The first is on Al-Barghuthi himself to support the options of his nomination, and the second is on his opponents who support the candidacy of Mahmud Abbas.
In accordance with new information, a special circular was issued inside the Al-Aqsa Brigades the day before yesterday which was distributed on a limited scale and in a secret manner. This circular supports the nomination of Al-Barghuthi in principle and as a political stance. But the more important point is that it reveals some secrets that took place in the famous meeting inside the Israeli prison between Al-Barghuthi and Minister Qaddurah Faris. It also clarifies some of the ambiguities that are absent from the media scene and that relate either to Al-Barghuthi's re-nomination of himself, or prior to that, his announcement after the meeting with Qaddurah Faris that he was withdrawing his candidacy in favor of the Fatah Movement's candidate, Mahmud Abbas.
An internal circular for the Al-Aqsa Brigades
The circular, the main points of which Al-Quds al-Arabi has acquired, clarifies many ambiguities and issues that confirm that Al-Barghuthi reached agreement with Qaddurah Faris inside the prison that he will declare his withdrawal in the interest of Mahmud Abbas. In return, Barghuthi gets a number of specific conditions that Abbas is supposed to have declared no later than 72 hours after Al-Barghuthi's announcement that he was withdrawing.
The circular stressed that Qaddurah Faris knows in detail what the conditions Al-Barghuthi set are and that he was informed of them. He then contacted Al-Barghuthi after the prison meeting, confirming that Abbas and his group accepted these conditions, which are still unknown. Minutes later, Al-Barghuthi announced his withdrawal from the elections in favor of Abbas.
Prior to that, the circular noted that Al-Barghuthi informed Qaddurah Faris categorically or reached an agreement with him that he will break the deal if Abbas does not meet the required conditions within the specified period. This implicitly means that Qaddurah Faris participated in a political campaign the objective of which was to submit Al-Barghuthi to a fait accompli without committing to what was agreed upon during the famous prison meeting.
According to suggestions in the circular, Abbas did not abide by these unknown conditions. Before declaring his own candidacy, he tried to make contact many times but did not receive a firm answer, despite the fact that he exceeded the afore-mentioned period of 72 hours.
Leading circles in the Al-Aqsa Brigades confirm that Al-Barghuthi was forced to declare his nomination after he felt that some game was going on to force him to submit to the fait accompli, without implementing the concerned conditions. Al-Barghuthi believes that Minister Qaddurah Faris was also involved in this game, despite their personal friendship. This was the main motivator behind Al-Barghuthi's announcement that he was nominating himself once again and reneging on the old agreement, after consultations with the leaders of the Al-Aqsa Brigades in the West Bank.
The circular did not specify the nature of the conditions referred to earlier, but they most likely are conditions relating to public political stances to protect the intifadah and the Al-Aqsa Brigades and to show commitment to some firm principles. However, the circular also hints implicitly that these conditions will be declared within the next couple of days. Palestinian public opinion will be informed of the secrets behind everything that took place, beginning with the Al-Barghuthi meeting with Minister Faris and ending with the current situation.
Amidst all this, there is information noting that decisive contacts are taking place currently inside the Al-Aqsa Brigades to decide the matter once and for all, finally, publicly, and in a unified manner, regarding Al-Barghuthi's nomination. The commanders of the influential wings within the Brigades are developing a unifying stance in this direction within the internal organizations of the Brigades, at least in the West Bank.
The Gaza Group is the only one outside the flock
The compass of allegiances inside the Al-Aqsa Brigades currently points to the fact that the Brigades wing in Nabulus and the region around have made their decision to support Marwan al-Barghuthi, while the same decision was made in the same direction in the Brigades wing in Ramallah and its environs. Extensive contacts took place last Saturday and Sunday with the Brigades in Hebron and Bethlehem where they have been rather hesitant. But the contacts that took place with them decided their stance also in the same direction.
The same sources say that the Al-Aqsa Brigades in Gaza are alone in their negative decision not to nominate Al-Barghuthi. There is no consensus within the Brigades groups in the north and south of the Gaza Strip over this matter. The reason, according to some authorities within the Al-Aqsa Brigades in the West Bank, is the influences of some figures, such as Muhammad al-Dahlan and others on the Brigades groups in the Gaza Strip.
It is clear that the West Bank Brigades, which agree over nominating and supporting Al-Barghuthi, are trying to make their comrades in the Gaza Strip decide in the same direction in order to avert a division and to guard against expected infiltrations. It is known that contacts with the Brigades' groups in the Gaza Strip are the focal reason for the delay in the announcement of the final and decisive stance. They are also the reason for delaying clarification of the conditions that were agreed upon and not implemented by Qaddurah Faris and Mahmud Abbas. A final decision on this matter is expected to be made within the next few days. The core of the group supporting Al-Barghuthi's nomination in Nabulus, Ramallah, Hebron, and Bethlehem, are ready, after having exhausted all contacts with the Gaza group, to declare their stance without the latter, even if this means a split inside the Brigades.
It seems that the other side supporting Abbas is trying at the same time to carry out a harsh and violent pressure campaign on anyone they can apply pressure on within the wings of the Al-Aqsa Brigades, in order to fragment the determination of the firm and controlling group that support Al-Barghuthi. This also explains the emergence of media expressions about differing stances within the Brigades every now and then.
Thus, there is currently a state of renewed conflict. Each of these two sides is displaying the extent of what power they have to apply pressure. Things sometimes get out of hand among some of the young leaderships of the second rank in the Brigades because of the pressures from the Abbas group. This is a matter that is being followed up hour by hour by the cohesive group that supports Al-Barghuthi's nomination and that is applying pressure on him personally to consider his nomination decision no longer his own personal decision.
Generally, all these conflicting pressures are being applied on the joint leadership in the Al-Aqsa Brigades groups, not because of the number power of these groups inside the Fatah Movement. Their number and marketing power with respect to figures and statistics tend to support Abbas. But the Al-Aqsa groups are heeded and highly influential; they cannot be dismissed easily if they decide to wage a battle of votes during elections, not to make Al-Barghuthi succeed but to make Abbas fail.
Facts indicate that the Al-Aqsa Brigades' strong presence within the Fatah frameworks as well as inside the Palestinian popular bases that have not joined the Fatah Movement or opposition movements, have turned it into an opponent that must be reckoned with and a ground force that cannot be ignored, particularly if they insist on nominating Al-Barghuthi under the banner of the possibility that principles may be forfeited in a Abbas nomination.
It seems that the groups opposed to Abbas within the frameworks of the Brigades have taken action in well-known directions now, after feeling excessive displeasure at Mahmud Abbas' interference in the media institutions when he asked Palestinian Television and journalists and mediamen to stop what he called incitement against Israel. Those who were displeased believed that Abbas jumped the gun and behaved like he was responsible for managing Palestinian national media even before he was officially accorded a position that qualified him to issue instructions and general directives to the media camp that belongs to the Fatah Movement.
The method of choosing Qaddurah Faris
Before that, the facts that Al-Quds al-Arabi has uncovered reveal that when Mahmud Abbas decided to send a delegate to Marwan al-Barghuthi in prison after the Revolutionary Council's unanimous vote in his favor, he thought of selecting one of three people considered closest to Marwan Al-Barghuthi. These were Qaddurah Faris, Uthman Abu-Gharbiyah, and Ahmad Ghunaym.
At that time, Abbas asked the experts to select one of the three names listed above. Qaddurah Faris was chosen to visit Al-Barghuthi on the grounds that he is a distinguished pragmatist who has a special ability to convince Al-Barghuthi to withdraw. Furthermore, contrary to Abu-Gharbiyah and Ghunaym, Faris is good at conveying messages without distorting them or their content. He can conduct this mission with dedication to the idea that he is merely a messenger conveying a message, not a party in a matter that is subject to negotiation.
Based on this stance, Faris was the most appropriate person to take part in the campaign to inform Marwan of the Revolutionary Council's decision and to get the message across to him. However, the leadership frameworks in the Al-Aqsa Brigades accuse Qaddurah Faris currently of participating, for some incomprehensible or unjustifiable reasons, in the game of preventing Marwan from nominating himself at the beginning. He is also being accused of not adhering to the text that was agreed upon he should use with Al-Barghuthi.
In another development, the sources revealed the main reason that prevented the central leaders of the Al-Aqsa Brigade at the beginning, specifically when Marwan Al-Barghuthi declared he was nominating himself, from making a decisive and public decision to support Marwan. The reason was the absence of contact and a pre-agreement over the timing of the declaration and the role Marwan's wife, Fadwa al-Barghuthi, played in this direction.
There is an incident that is being discussed by the Al-Aqsa Brigades, since it is the reason for the leaders' displeasure with Mrs. Fadwa. On the sidelines of a popular meeting organized by the Al-Aqsa Brigades official in Nabulus, Samir Darabshah, for Fadwa in one of the camps, Marwan's wife heard chants from the crowds calling for her husband to run in the presidential elections. From this context, Fadwa reportedly reacted in an emotional manner and took action alone without prior coordination. She leaked the report about the possibility of Al-Barghuthi nominating himself. This made the Al-Aqsa Brigades' leaders feel very angry because it was Fadwa who made the announcement, and not Marwan or others. Because of their discontent, the central leaders of the Brigades tended to remain silent to begin with, and statements were issued from a group of the Brigades in Gaza expressing discontent with Al-Barghuthi. This was overcome later on after the contents of what happened between Qaddurah Faris and Marwan in the prison meeting were revealed. These are contents that were revealed within the organization of the Brigades, whose stance changed after that.
(Description of Source: London Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic -- London-based independent Arab nationalist daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line; generally pro-Palestinian, tends to be sympathetic to Bin Ladin)
Translated from the original by WNC.
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