The top White House official for coordinating the federal government's counteroffensive against terrorism resigned yesterday in a surprise decision that removed one of the Bush administration's leading advocates of launching aggressive and unconventional attacks on terrorist networks.
The departure of retired Army Gen. Wayne A. Downing, who also has been an outspoken hawk in administration debates about how to deal with Saddam Hussein, raised questions among security experts about both the administration's plans to improve homeland security through a massive government reorganization and the direction of its policy on Iraq.
Downing could not be reached for comment on his decision, which came 10 months after he joined the White House staff as deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism. A White House statement announcing Downing's resignation offered no reason for it.
"He's completed the initial taskings that the president, Dr. [Condoleezza] Rice and Governor [Tom] Ridge set for him," said Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the National Security Council. Rice is national security adviser and Ridge heads the office of homeland security.
The White House said Downing, 62, would be succeeded by another retired general, John A. Gordon, who is chief of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, and previously was deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Several defense experts said they were stunned by Downing's departure. "I think it's bad news for the war," said Eliot Cohen, an expert on defense strategy at Johns Hopkins University. "Downing is a thoughtful warrior, unconventional in the best sense, with a creative military mind, which is what you need when you are fighting a strange war."
Downing has been a leading advocate of what has come to be known as "the Downing plan" for confronting Iraq. That approach, which calls for using a mix of Special Operations troops, air power and Iraqi rebels to topple Hussein, has been viewed skeptically by much of the military leadership, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Top military officials, including Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander for U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, are more inclined toward a Gulf War-like force of at least 200,000 troops that would take several months to assemble.
Downing has been effective in debates over Iraq policy because he is a Gulf War veteran who commanded part of the Special Operations forces in the 1991 conflict. "Because of his background, he could argue his position in a way" that administration hawks who lack military experience can't in their debates with the uniformed military, said one Republican foreign policy adviser.
Some security experts speculated that Downing was spurred to leave because his plan for Iraq had been rejected by the Joint Chiefs. But others dismissed that. "This isn't about some massive policy loss on Iraq. I think he wanted to get back to Colorado," where he has a home, one national security official said.
Others argued that Downing was dismayed by the administration's halting progress on homeland security issues. It resisted creating a department of homeland security for months, for example, and then announced it would do so on short notice. "Homeland security is a fiasco, and that's probably why," said one security expert.
But the predominant view among officials and specialists who have worked with him was that Downing, a career Special Operations officer fond of talking about the need to "think like a bank robber," was uncomfortable with his limited advisory role as a White House staffer.
"He was told, and foolishly believed, that he would have co-equal status with Condi," said one Republican defense expert, referring to Rice. "He thought he would have involvement in all sorts of things that it turned out he isn't involved in. And he wasn't allowed to do the things he thought he was hired to do." Several other people in Downing's office also plan to leave the government, this person added.
With the war on terrorism occupying much of the time of President Bush and his national security Cabinet officers, added another official, there was little work left for Downing to do. "If the principals are doing terrorism all the time, by definition that means you don't have as much responsibility," he said.
Even more fundamentally, said others who know him, Downing's forceful personality and time as a four-star commander left him ill-prepared for the life of a White House staffer. As a former top general, noted one official, he was accustomed to running things on his own. "He does suffer a little bit from four-staritis," this official said.
"He's a very hard-charging, can-do guy, and the National Security Council isn't like that right now," said Francis Brooke, the Washington adviser to the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella organization of Iraqi groups opposed to Hussein's regime. Brooke said he had worked closely with Downing before the general returned to government. Under Rice, Brooke said, the NSC "coordinates policy, and that's not Wayne's personality."
"I know he was unhappy with the bureaucracy," said Larry C. Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official. "It was generally known that he was not a happy camper for quite a while."
Johnson said a clash between Downing and Franks over how best to confront Iraq "may have been the straw that broke the camel's back."
Downing spent much of his time at the White House struggling with a variety of federal offices to create a "data fusion center" that would keep 24-hour watch and track all interagency intelligence on terrorist activities. It was widely opposed by the intelligence bureaucracy, one official said.
Downing recently prevailed, and was preparing to begin assigning staff to the new center. It now appears that that plan will be revised and the center instead will be made part of the proposed Homeland Security Department, the official said.
Staff writers Barton Gellman and Vernon Loeb contributed to this report.
© 2002 The Washington Post Company
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