The following is a transcript of a debate held at Georgetown Law School's Gewirz Student Center on November 18, 2002. The debate featured an American Prospect team (University of Maryland professors Benjamin Barber and William Galston) arguing against invasion of Iraq and a New Republic team (TNR senior editor Jonathan Chait and former CIA analyst Kenneth Pollack) arguing in favor of invasion. The moderator was TAP co-editor Robert Kuttner, and the debate was introduced by TAP executive editor Ben Taylor.
Mr. Taylor: We're going to start in a second and then welcome to the Georgetown Law Center. My name is Ben Taylor. I'm the Executive Editor of The American Prospect, and it's my pleasure to welcome everyone tonight. This is the fourth in a series of debates that The American Prospect has sponsored along with the Schumann Foundation. And, without further adieu, I'm going to turn it over to Bob Kuttner, the Co-Editor and Co-Founder of The American Prospect. Bob.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you Ben. Let me also extend a welcome. As your program shows, the proposition that we're debating tonight is "Resolved: The American invasion of Iraq is neither in the national nor the global interest". The recent U.N. resolution demanding that Iraq cooperate with U.N. inspections changes the form of the debate but not the substance. Because the Administration still holds to the view that unless Saddam Hussein complies with compliance defined by the Bush Administration, the U.S. can and should preemptively invade Iraq even if the U.N. and our Allies do not go along. So, the course of unilateralism and invasion, which have been explicit Administration policies, remain distinct possibilities. This issue has split the Liberal community, and it's interesting that our debaters are a team representing writers for The American Prospect and a team organized by The New Republic. A majority of Congressional Democrats in the Senate narrowly supported the War Resolution in the House. A narrow majority of Democrats opposed it. The Prospect's two debaters, as your program indicates, Bill Galston and Ben Barber. Both affiliated with the University of Maryland. Ben Barber perhaps known best for a book which has probably the shortest possible summation of the current global situation, Jihad vs. McWorld, and William Galston, best known as a Senior Advisor in the Clinton Administration and to Vice President Gore in the 2000 Campaign and as a leading theorist of the DLC. They will argue the affirmative case. For the negative case Jon Chait, Senior Editor at The New Republic, author of the influential recent New Republic piece "Why Liberals Should Support the War". And Ken Pollack, former CIA, Iran and Iraq Analyst, former NSC staffer during the Clinton Administration and author of the current book, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq. This is a slight modification on Oxford Debate Rules, not food fight television but serious engagement of an important issue with opening statements followed by cross-examinations and audience participation and then summations. So to begin 4 minutes, and we'll have a time keeper putting up warning signs for the affirmative team, Ben Barber.
Mr. Barber: Thank you very much and welcome. I'm glad finally we have an opportunity in the United States and here in Washington to talk about and debate issues which have been confronted largely in silence by this country, I think, to our great detriment. We are affirming the argument that an American invasion of Iraq is neither in the national nor the global interest. The American plan to invade Iraq, and this is very important to our position, I believe is an instance of an evolving Bush doctrine of approaching international politics, above all the War on Terrorism, with strategies that are unilateralist, rooted in a new and radical doctrine of preventive war which breaks free from just war doctrine, doctrines of self defense, even doctrines of judicial preemption, that are narrowly militaristic and that are unaccompanied by economic and civic strategies (In effect, a World War II without a Marshall Plan) that are focused on nation states rather than on the new non-governmental criminal agencies and groups that represent terrorism. Policies that are contemptuous of international law, of multi-lateralism, and of the internationalism of which the United States has been the chief architect and the chief beneficiary in the last 30 or 40 years. And finally, resistant to deliberation and debate of exactly the kind that we are trying to have this evening. Now, while we understand and acknowledge that there has been a radical change in one part of that policy and that as a result of the leadership of Colin Powell and others in the Administration, Bush has now turned towards the United Nations and to coalition building. To the extent that is true, we would say, "That simply means we have already won the argument before we started." Because that's precisely the position that those who opposed a unilateralist preventive war were making and to the extent the Bush Administration now agrees with us, that can only be a good thing for the argument that we're making. But, I think we nonetheless continue to believe that even if sanctioned by Congress and the United Nations that an invasion of Iraq will serve neither American interests nor the interests of the world for these five reasons. First, there's deep uncertainty about the ability and will of Iraq to resist, and disagreement among intelligence agencies, the services, and others around the world which makes the costs of an invasion in American lives and civilian lives impossible to calculate. Thus, the impact on the region, the impact on reactions against America, impossible to calculate. As the unpredictability of outcomes arises, the potential cost to the United States and the World gets higher and higher. Secondly, even if the military operation is brief and relatively costless, I think unlikely but possible, the long-term outcome of a so-called "successful war" that issues in a so-called "successful regime change and disarmament" still remain unpredictable in a radical sense. The question remains in simple terms "Why Iraq, why now, why so suddenly?" Thirdly, even if swift and effective short and long term policies of war work, there will be a diversion of material resources, of funding resources, of intelligence resources to this war, while Osama is still alive, Al Qaida is still active around the world. And finally, as part of the War on Terror, the invasion of Iraq, if it happens, will reproduce the errors of the war in Afghanistan by acting as if nation states are the primary adversaries in the War on Terror and not the new malevolent NGOs, like Al Qaida, which cannot be whipped by state against state action. In this sense then we think even under the current circumstances of U.N. and Congressional support the invasion of Iraq would be a fiasco for the United States, its neighbors, its friends, and a success only for the enemy's of the United States. Thank you.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. We've flipped the sequence slightly at the request of The Republic team so Ken Pollack is going to be opening. And, let me remind you that if you have questions during the audience question/answer period, please fill out one of the cards at the back table and one of our staff will collect them.
Mr. Pollack: Good evening, thanks so much for coming out to join us. As Ben Barber pointed out, this is an extremely important debate and I think the more people who get to hear these views, the better off we will all be. Let me start off by saying that I'm not here to defend the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy. I don't think that's what this debate is about. This debate is about Iraq, and on the issue of the Iraq I think that it is easy to distinguish between what the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy may be and what our policy toward Iraq should be. I am of the opinion that the United States will sooner or later have to fight a war with Saddam Hussein. That is based on the 34 years of history that we have with Saddam Hussein in power and what we now know about Saddam Hussein's thinking, both about the United States, his role, his mission, and his thinking about nuclear weapons. Let's remember that in 1991 it was the United Nations that put in place the policy of containment. Not the United States, the United Nations. This was done because there was a consensus in the world that Saddam Hussein was simply too dangerous a leader to allow to acquire weapons of mass destruction and, particularly, nuclear weapons. We pursued the policy of containment throughout most of the 1990s, and what we learned by the mid 1990s was that the United States and only a few other countries were the only countries willing to actually try to make containment work. And, it is for that reason the containment failed in the 1990s. And the reasons that it failed in the 1990s still apply today, and they are undoubtedly likely to make any future attempts to contain Iraq fail as well. What's more, because the inspectors have been gone from Iraq for 4 years and because we found out that the Iraqis have been making progress on nuclear weapons even while the inspectors had been in Iraq, the consensus among western intelligence agencies, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Israel, is that the Iraqis have everything that they need to build nuclear weapons; it is simply a matter of time. Simply a matter of time before they acquire the fissile material, highly enriched fissile material that they will need to build nuclear weapons. What we know about Saddam Hussein's thinking about nuclear weapons is exceedingly dangerous. Saddam apparently believes that once he has acquired nuclear weapons, it is the United States that will be deterred. That we will be so terrified of getting into any kind of a war with him, for fear of it escalating to a nuclear exchange, that we will not dare to try to take him on. And, therefore, he will be free, once again, to resume his pattern of expansion and aggression in the region, attacking which ever neighbors he likes, black mailing those that he chooses. This is exactly why we went to war in 1991 because we, in fact the entire international community, recognized that Saddam Hussein's aggression in the vital Persian Gulf region is simply too much for the world to bare. The Persian Gulf, unfortunately, is too important to the world's economic, military, and political stability, and as a result, we chose to go to war. I think the choice that we have before us is not do we go to war with Iraq or not, but do we go to war with Iraq sooner or later. And, I think that that is a very important set of choices. Because while it is certainly true that a war with Iraq sooner could potentially be costly, it certainly will run risks. I think it is unquestionably true that a war postponed 'til Saddam's time and place of choosing: after he has acquired nuclear weapons, potentially after he has acquired advanced biological weapons and advanced conventional munitions will be infinitely more costly than a war fought in the next few years. To wrap it up, I don't think that it is crucial that the United States go to war at this particular moment. I choose not to debate the particular timing right now. Although there are certainly issues to be made on either side, but I believe that the choice we have before us is to go to war with Saddam Hussein before he has acquired a nuclear weapon or to wait until he makes war on us, after he has acquired them, when the costs will truly be horrific.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. Bill Galston.
Mr. Galston: On June 1st of this year President Bush delivered a speech at West Point in which he set forth a new foreign policy, Defense Doctrine of Unilateral Action, based on the theory of pre-emption and with the aim of regime change. I found this deeply alarming, it spurred me to action or at least what passes for action among academics, namely words. And in a mid-June article in the Washington Post I set forth my belief, which I continue to hold today, that the long term interests of the United States are best promoted by an international system that is as law-like as the general nature of international relations refracted through specific circumstances will permit. And, I offered three categories of objections to the new Bush policy: one based on just war tradition, as it has been developed for a thousand years; a second based on established doctrines of international law and I argued that the Bush doctrine does not fit established definitions of anticipatory self-defense; a third based on prudence, in particular the blow that a foreign policy based on the new Bush doctrine would deal with international cooperation in other areas along with the perverse presidential force of the new Bush doctrine. Imagine the Pakistanis seizing hold of the new Bush doctrine and using it for their own purposes. My alarm intensified through the summer, capped by Vice President Cheney's bellicose August speeches. This drove me to state my objections to the new Bush policy at greater length in The American Prospect, a journal with which I've had some well advertised differences in the past. Since September 11th, President Bush's speech at the U.N., there's a new context, a shift in policy that has now been chronicled on the front pages of the Washington Post by Bob Woodward. Instead of a policy of unilateral action based on pre-emption and aimed at regime change, we are now committed to a multi-lateral strategy based on the Doctrine of Enforcement and aimed at disarmament. Public opinion surveys confirm what common sense suggests. The overwhelming majority of Americans are far more comfortable with this new context than with the one it replaced, and I know I am. Regardless of one's views on this question, the United States of America has pledged its good faith to the process that U.N. Resolution 1441 has established the kind of process that Mr. Pollack and his important book labels "the inspections trap." So, the question becomes in this new context under what circumstances would armed conflict with Iraq promote either the national interest of the United States or the interests of the world, and here's my answer. Number one there would have to be a significant Iraqi breach of the terms of the Resolution broadly acknowledged by nations other than the United States. Second, there would have to be an organization and justification of coercive action to enforce disarmament and not to install a new regime. Now, granted the former may in practice entail the latter, but it is very, very significant that the two not be alighted. Third, there would have to be a reasonable probability that this action would not inflict unacceptable collateral damage on other regimes or on other conflicts in the region. With Mr. Pollack, I am skeptical of the Hawks proposition that the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad. It's more likely to be the other way around. Finally, there would have to be a reasonable probability that this action would not impede the War on Terrorism. These two wars are not the same, and despite President Bush, there's no clear linkage between them. There is a conflict between these two wars as the Washington Post piece about the stretched resources of the Central Intelligence Agency makes clear. The results of the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan to date have been unimpressive. It's sometimes asked "Can we walk and chew gum at the same time?" But it's not clear that we can even walk. For all of these reasons, I agree with the knowledgeable analyst who writes "We have some unfinished business that should take precedence over invading Iraq. Namely, we first need to deal with the threat of terrorism. Although Saddam Hussein's acquisition of nuclear weapons may ultimately constitute a greater threat to the United States and the world than Al Qaida terrorism, it is also a somewhat more distant threat. We don't necessarily have to finish the war before taking up the arms against Saddam. However, we certainly need to be at a point where we do not have monthly government warnings of possible terrorist attacks." This astute analyst, as the wise among you have guessed, is Mr. Pollack. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kuttner: Appropriate an extra 30 seconds to John Chait.
Mr. Chait: Thanks. I want to let you all know a little bit about where I'm coming from. Like Ken Pollack, I'm also not here to defend the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy. I think this notion of pre-emptive war is extremely alarming. This idea that the United States can go to war without any sanction of rule of law, without having been attacked anywhere we want, without consulting with our Allies is not something that I'm here to support. But, I think going to war with Iraq does not fall into this category at all and that's been a big mistake a lot of my fellow Liberals, I think, have made. As Ken mentioned, at the culmination of the Gulf War, the countries that were aligned against Iraq, with the United Nations, forced Saddam Hussein to agree to disarm his weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the war. I think forcing this condition upon Iraq was certainly a very reasonable thing to ask, given Saddam's past behavior. Allowing him to rebuild weapons of mass destruction would not allow the world to return to any kind of a safe and peaceful condition. The problem is how we enforce this. The first Bush Administration, and following that the Clinton Administration, believed that we could force Iraq to comply with weapons inspectors simply with language and, failing that, with bombing. At the time it seemed completely reasonable that that might work, but as we now know it didn't work at all. Iraq consistently stymied weapons inspectors coming up with pretexts and excuses arbitrary justifications; the weapons inspectors bent over backwards to comply with the unreasonable demands. But, that simply emboldened Iraq to make even more unreasonable demands. We also know that the United Nations did not take seriously Iraq's refusal at all. The United States at times tried to define Iraqi refusal as a material breach of the sanctions and the inspections regime. And clearly it was. To not allow inspectors into a weapons building is nothing if not a material breach. And yet, the United Nations refused. Why did they refuse? France and Russia have commercial interests in Iraq; their oil companies predominant among them. They also have real- politik interests. France has a large Muslim population, which it is looking to appease. Russia has geo-political interests which make it want to ally with Iraq to counter balance American power. None of these is a great principle that should be driving American foreign policy. In other words, the United Nations doesn't have any inherent moral prestige simply because it's an international body. Now we have to look at how we got to the point of where we are now, where we actually have a functioning inspections process that's ready to go. The only reason, I think, that we've gotten to the current point is that the United States has made it clear that we're ready to go to war unilaterally if the United Nations does not allow inspectors to return to Iraq. And that's an important point because you can say, as Bill did, that now we're doing the right thing whereas previously by talking about regime change and unilateral war, we were doing the wrong thing. But, I think it's undeniable that the only way, the only reason we've gotten to this current place is by pursuing our previous policy. The United Nations has shown no interest whatsoever in allowing even weapons inspections to take place, let alone to back them with the threat of war. The other thing you have to ask is "What will allow the weapons inspections to take place?" Now, as I've already said, we need these inspections to make sure that Saddam Hussein does not acquire nuclear weapons and to enforce the original United Nations mandates that were put in place at the end of the Gulf War. To me, it's unlikely that these inspections will succeed because Saddam Hussein has spent the last 10 years learning from the west that we will simply appease him and allow him to defy the United Nations whenever he chooses. However, I'd say the only chance that we have for inspectors to succeed is if Saddam Hussein is completely convinced that the United States will go to war and depose him if he doesn't. The final point I want to address is what happens in Iraq after the war if we do depose him. I agree that it's a chancy and a risky situation, and there could be some ill effects that we don't imagine. However, right now we have a murderous, aggressive tyrant who's bent on acquiring nuclear weapons and has invaded his neighbors several times and attempted to commit genocide upon his own people. So, it seems to me that whatever we have after the war cannot possibly be worse than what we have right now.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. This is the part of the debate where we have cross-examinations. And I suspect this is gonna' be the most interesting. We have 2 minute rebuttals each, beginning with Ben Barber.
Mr. Barber: Well, I'm really delighted to hear that our opponents here do not support Bush's war. I myself haven't developed a position on Pollack's war or Chait's war. I may or may not support it, but it's Bush's war I'm here to oppose. And, if they also oppose it, I'm glad they've joined our team in that, because, the fact is this will be Bush's war, it won't be Pollack's war on Pollack's terms, or Chait's war, or The New Republic's war, or The American Prospect's war. It will be President Bush's war, and he has told us the terms on which he intends to fight the war. He will fight it against an enemy that he will define as dangerous to the United States, and he will fight war when and if he thinks it's necessary: whether or not the United Nations approves and whether or not it's fought under multi-lateral treaties or under the guise of international law. He will certainly work with the U.N. if he can, but it's very clear that if he can't, he will have his war anyway. It's that war that we are here to oppose today, not some theoretical war. The second problem I have with the responses, or what's on the table here from our opponents, is that they themselves have made no clear case for the linkage between what is going on today in Iraq and terrorism. Chait himself says in his article, "There is not yet convincing evidence that Iraq lent meaningful support to Al Qaida." Exactly, there's no evidence for that, which means that we're only making war on a murderous tyrant. But, if we're going to make war on murderous tyrants, the number should go from about 1 or 2 to 20 or 30 almost immediately, since there are at least 20 or 30 murderous tyrants around the world that we could afford to make war on. Indeed, there is now a piece recently suggesting that Syria is aspiring to develop weapons of mass destruction, and while the new tyrant there has not yet proved himself to be murderous, he's certainly dangerous. So, why not then go after Syria? Iran is run by murderous tyrants: they certainly should be on our list. And from there we can move to North Korea, to China, and to a number of other murderous tyrants as well. There is no justification, in terms of the War on Terrorism, for this war and making war on murderous tyrants, who may or may not have weapons.
Mr. Pollack: Ah, come on Ben, those are straw men. That's not what we're talking about at all. Saddam Hussein is a murderous tyrant, and you're absolutely right that if all we were doing was talking about going to war on murderous tyrants, there would be a long list. And, maybe we should have a debate over whether we shouldn't go to war against all those murderous tyrants, but that's not what we're talking about here. Saddam Hussein is a threat to the United States of America. He is determined to seek revenge. He has tried already to do so. He is working as fast as he can to acquire nuclear weapons. And, what we know about his thinking regarding how he intends to employ those nuclear weapons is terrifying. It is one of the reasons why the Bush Administration itself adopted a policy of regime change in 1998. It is why many of my former colleagues from the government, who served in the Bush Administration, first Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration, also believe that this is a threat that we are going to have to deal with sooner rather than later. Now, with regard to this question of timing I certainly agree with Ben's points that the Bush Administration is going to do it their way. It's not going to be necessarily on my terms. And I obviously agree with all of Bill's points about the necessary conditions: many of those same conditions are conditions that I laid out in my book. That said, I want to actually give the Administration some credit. They've come a long way and I don't think that my opponents are giving them that credit: you can say that it's been grudging, you can say that Cheney and Rumsfeld have fought it every step of the way. That all may be true but the Administration has come a long way from where they were this summer. Now again, this is not to suggest that I am necessarily comfortable with going to war right this second. As Bill Galston pointed out, my preference would be to spend a little bit more time working out the necessary pre-conditions, the preparations to make it work. But, I think we should also recognize that the Administration has gone to the U.N. despite the fact that they claimed adamantly that they weren't going to. They did go to the Congress despite the fact that they were absolutely determined not to. They are going to use a big force despite the fact that they originally were absolutely determined not to. They've even gone so far as to lay out a road map for the Palestinians and the Israelis. It's still a far cry from where I'd like to see them go, but this isn't quite the straw man that Ben Barber just laid out.
Mr. Galston: Thank you. Well, I emphasized in my opening statement that the Bush Administration has come a long way from June 1st. I agree with you on that point, but I don't think they've come far enough to satisfy you. You have emphasized, and I absolutely agree, that an invasion of Iraq would be practically inadvisable and morally inexcusable unless we are committed to doing whatever it takes to reconstruct the government post-war and the society along decent constitutional and hopefully democratic lines. This is an extraordinary challenge, even more challenging than our long-term occupation of post-war Japan: particularly because what we do in Iraq will be seen through the prism of regional history. The United States will be denounced not only in the region as an imperialist and colonial power, placing us and our friends on the defensive, but more to the point, and this is where I really want to engage, this cannot be sustained as a policy unless the American people are fully committed to such a program. George Marshall and Harry Truman understood this: President Bush does not. He has made no effort to level with the country about the costs or consequences of a long-term occupation of Iraq. Moreover, the Pollack program cannot be carried out unless the Bush Administration is fully committed to it. But, there is no evidence that this Administration is much interested in democratic nation building and considerable evidence to the contrary. And, if you don't believe me, take a look at Jackson Diehl's Op Ed piece in today's Washington Post. In my judgment it would be the height of irresponsibility for us to smash the current regime and then fail to build something better. But, looking at our half hearted efforts to build basic security, the rule of law, and democratic institutions in Afghanistan, who can have any confidence in the Administrations commitment to a much harder task in Iraq?
Mr. Pollack: Mostly I want to respond to what Ben Barber has said. First of all, I may have left the mistaken impression that I don't support Bush's war. I do. I don't support his motives for doing so. But, that to me isn't a reason not to support the policy itself. If he came out for, as I wrote in my piece, universal health care for crass political reasons, I'd be for it, even if I didn't like his rationale. Second of all, the justification for going to war with Iraq or at least using war as a threat to enforce sanctions is not to stop terrorism. But I don't see why it has to be. If we wanted to role back the Bush tax cut, that would not help terrorism either. But, everything we do doesn't necessarily have to stop terrorism. The rationale that I laid out has nothing to do with terrorism: it has to do with enforcing a U.N. resolution that I think is completely justified and necessary for world peace, designed to stop Saddam from gaining nuclear weapons, and one that hasn't been complied with by Iraq. You also lay out this slippery slope scenario, whereby if we attack one murderous tyrant, then we're going to have to attack them all. I don't, I don't see why that necessarily applies to this situation. What Iraq did is different and unique from other murderous tyrants. For one thing, Iraq has been aggressive and invaded its neighbors repeatedly. Second of all, its dictator is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, which makes its aggression all the more dangerous. Finally, there has been a U.N. sanction in place that was a condition to stop a war. The United Nations was at war with Iraq and we agreed to stop being at war with Iraq on the condition that Iraq would disarm and allow inspectors in. And it refused. So there are no other countries that I'm aware of for which those conditions apply, and that to me is a rationale which is completely different from other dictatorships.
Mr. Galston: Mr. Pollack, continuing my previous line of argument you've written in your book that people who oppose a long-term U.S. occupation of Iraq for purposes of democratic reconstruction argue, and I quote, "that a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq, no matter what it was actually doing would be portrayed as an imperialist effort to subjugate Iraq and that this would cause popular unrest throughout the Arab world for as long as the United States remained there. They argue that undertaking an ambit, ambitious nation building effort in Iraq could produce instability or revolution among other U.S. allies in the region." Now your book is structured as an answer to charges against your position, but to the best of my knowledge, you never really answer that one. You never really reply to that parade of horribles, and in particular I'd like to ask you what would be the gain if a long-term invasion of, and occupation of Iraq triggered a regime change in Pakistan such that we then have a radical Islamic nation that already has the bomb?
Mr. Pollack: Remind me not to write any more books.
Mr. Barber: Don't write any more books.
Mr. Pollack: Good questions. I actually do believe that I answered it, but it's a very important question and let me lay it out. With regard to the charges of imperialism and the possibility of unrest in the region, I regard these as very real possibilities. But, I think the right answer is it depends very much on how we undertake the reconstruction of Iraq. I think that if the United States goes in and we set up a McArthur-like system, similar to what we did in Japan and Germany. I think that those charges are likely to stick against us, regardless of whatever good intentions we may have. As a result, the point I lay out in the book, the argument that I developed in the book, is I think the United States does have to conduct the reconstruction of Iraq in a very different fashion from how we conducted the reconstruction of Germany and Japan. Instead, the models that we should be looking to are those that we employed in Bosnia, to a certain extend in Kosovo, in East Timor, and elsewhere in the last 10 to 12 years where the United States would play more of a behind-the-scene role. We would be the core of a multi-national security force that would handle the security requirements of the state. Leave the actual political and economic reconstruction of Iraq to the United Nations and the army of non-governmental organizations which have arisen over the last 20 years, which are far better equipped to do it than we are. And, which come in as an unbiased force. They will not be seen as the United States, and in fact I think that if the United States steps to the side very quickly, allows the United Nations to lead the effort, and simply provides the resources, I think that those charges are likely not to exist at all. As far as unrest in the region, again, Mr. Galston, as you well know, this is one of the reasons that I want to make sure that before the United States goes into Iraq we have done everything necessary, and I've laid out any number of things that are necessary for us to do to minimize the chances of unrest in the region before we go in. Pakistan would certainly fall into that category. It is one of the reasons why although on the one hand, I think the sooner that we move against Iraq, the better, I am also willing to wait because there are repercussions that could ensue if the United States isn't fully prepared for this. And I want to make sure that diplomatically, economically, and militarily; before we embark on an invasion of Iraq, which will be a very big and potentially costly and potentially risky operation, we have done everything possible to minimize those risks. I think those are well within our capabilities: it's simply a matter of whether or not the Administration is willing to do so.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. Now you get to interrogate Bill Galston.
Mr. Pollack: Mr. Galston, I think that in general, perhaps the only point on which you and I disagree is with regard to the inspection regime and the necessary trigger. And so, I would like to put it to you to ask what do you think would be a sufficient enough Iraqi breach to constitute a trigger for going to war?
Mr. Galston: Well, let me say first that I think that the United States body language matters a lot. If we send a signal, which I think we're already in danger of doing that we are itching for this inspections regime to fail, that we are looking for any minimal technical excuse, that zero tolerance is an excuse for zero waiting then I think we're going to pay a huge price internationally. So, the first point is the Administration has to act as though it is committed to its own policy. We have gone through a very serious 2 months of negotiation and if we turn our back on it I think we will pay a very heavy price. Secondly, I think it is clear to most reasonable people what a significant, I will not use the adjective material, but a significant breach would be. If the Iraqis substantially impede free, unfettered, and immediate access to the inspection zones that the inspectors have designated. If they try to delay, obfuscate, if they engage in spying or anything of that sort and in an effort to deflect the inspection team or prevent it from carrying out its mission -that, in my judgment, would be the sort of breach that would warrant coercion in order to enforce the inspection regime. Now, that's a critical point. Because I do not believe that the Bush Administration is empowered either in law or as a matter of political consensus to use the breach of the inspection regime as the predicate for regime change in Iraq itself. It may be that that turns into a distinction without a difference, but we do not, as a matter of declaratory policy, have the right to act on that presumption.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. Ben Barber gets to question Jon Chait.
Mr. Barber: Because I may be in danger of becoming a straw man, I want to allow an iron man to ask my question for me. So, I'm going to quote a question here. This is in quotes "If you are going to go in and try to topple Saddam Hussein, you have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got Baghdad it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be a Shite regime, a Sunni regime, or a Kurdish regime, or one that tilts towards the Bathists, or one that tilts towards the Islamic fundamentalists. How much credibility is that government going to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How long does the U.S. military have to stay to protect the people that sign on for that government and what happens to it once we leave?" That was the question asked by Dick Cheney in 1991 when he was arguing we should not go into Baghdad. My question for you is what's changed between 1991 and today that make Dick Cheney's question irrelevant?
Mr. Chait: I don't subscribe to the proposition that everything Dick Cheney says is right. So, I don't feel compelled to apologize if he reverses his own policies. It's a simple question in one way, and it's a complicated question in another way. The simple answer to the question is whatever happens in Iraq after the war will be far better than what we have in Iraq right now. Whatever country we put in place will at least be able to meet a few minimal criteria. It won't be actively seeking nuclear weapons as one of the central goals of its government. It won't be regularly invading its neighbors. It won't be headed by a dictator whose psychology is almost uniquely aggressive among world leaders. Someone who is willing to do things that are completely irrational from his own point of view, such as sponsor an assassination of a former American President, which Saddam Hussein did and which, if successful, would quite likely have led to his own capture and an American invasion of Iraq. I would very much like to see a democratic, or at least benign government, in Iraq. Failing that, I'd like to see one that could give at least a decent standard of living to its people and not posse an aggressive foreign policy menace. I think there is a lot to gain in this. Right now if you're a Muslim, or if you're an Arab, you have two kinds of governments that you see before you in the Middle East. You see corrupt pro-Western governments that are highly repressive like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Or you see their opponents: people who would like an Iranian style government, Islamic fanatics. And that's really the only two choices that you have before you. And to a lot of people like that, especially if you're living in the first kind, the second kind doesn't really look so awful. If we could provide for them a third model, that would really have a lot of benefit. That would give them something different to aspire to. Now, I'm not saying I'm sure that that could happen, but if it doesn't happen, what will happen will be better than what we have right now.
Mr. Kuttner: You get to the table.
Mr. Chait: My question is you say you don't want war under any circumstances, even if it's sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. We know that Saddam Hussein, as I mentioned, is highly aggressive, is highly irrational even about his own survival in being aggressive, and is aggressively attempting to obtain weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. Do you not see any possible cataclysmic consequences if Saddam Hussein is to acquire nuclear weapons?
Mr. Barber: My problem is here that I've heard my country for the last 50 years, identify a succession of enemys and I've heard my fellow Americans, in many cases, ask for preventive war against them because they are totalitarian, because they are mad men, because they are irrational, because they take their shoes off at the United Nations and bang them on the table as Khrushchev did. I have heard again and again us state whatever current enemy we identify is such a perilous danger to us that we must go to war now. Now, fortunately in the past we have resisted that temptation, and we have stayed with containment and deterrents, which certainly have their own dangers as well. And I'm not particularly a fan of deterrents, particularly mutually assured destruction. But, it beats preventive war. I really mean it when I say that if you look around the world today, we can find a number of murderous tyrants. There was an article in the New York Times just a few days ago, in which, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, said as recently as last week, repeated concerns that Syria has a stock pile of a nerve agent and the ability to produce small amounts of a biological agent. In October, he also said Syria had benefited from Russian technology for its nuclear program. I could well imagine the same argument being made about Syria. Bill asked the question about Pakistan, which already has nuclear weapons, and of course North Korea has nuclear weapons. I'm unable to understand what the differences are between these various regimes and why in one case, quite abruptly, there's an absolute necessity to go to war. You've said several times that Iraq poses a direct threat to the United States. I have seen zero evidence for that. The President has made no case for Iraq posing a direct threat to the United States. It may pose a threat to its neighbor Iran, but that's one murderous tyrant against another, and I think we'd be grateful for that. It posed a threat to Kuwait, that was a threat to American oil, although not to democracy, and we still don't have democracy in Kuwait. But, this sudden selectivity that in fact moves us away from the genuine real targets of the War on Terror, Al Qaida and the sorts of forces in the world that create Al Qaida, to a war which I think is likely to improve the chances for Al Qaida recruiting more terrorists and making our security situation worse not better, convinces me that there is no case for which any evidence has currently been induced for making war on Iraq even with the United Nations.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you, thank you. Alright, I get a few questions, and then the audience gets lots of questions. Question for the "Yes" Team. We've heard Kenneth Pollack say very emphatically, and this is really the core of his argument, that sooner or later Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons, the means of delivering them. And he will use them either, at best, to blackmail the United States, or at worst, he will actually deliver them. I wonder if, in addition to challenging the case for pre-emptive war on the grounds of collateral damage to the region, to world security, to international institutions, to American credibility, do you also challenge that core premise, or do you agree with it? Bill.
Bill Galston: Who goes first?
Mr. Kuttner: Oh, go ahead.
Mr. Galston: Well, as public folks say in Washington, "I'm glad you asked." Because I think that, I think that we need to inspect that premise very carefully.
Mr. Kuttner: Coercively?
Mr. Galston: Because we've heard this argument before. And it is perfectly correct to say that if we do nothing significant to prevent that outcome, it will occur. There's every reason to believe that it will occur. But I believe that we are now in a position to make it very much less likely that in the foreseeable future Saddam Hussein will acquire either nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them. I think we now have it in our power to maintain maximum pressure on Iraq both internally and internationally.
Mr. Barber: And what is more, we are prepared to go in and stop someone who may or may not be in a position to get nuclear weapons and who in any case has shown no disposition to give them to terrorists, give any of his weapons to terrorist to do that. So, as always, it's a question of as compared to what? War in Iraq as compared to what? Bill, no question in my mind. let's fund.
Mr. Galston: ABM Treaty and acting like a good citizen, that's likely to do far more to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists than this projected war in Iraq will.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. Question for the "No" Team. Some of the most vociferous members of the pro Israel lobby in the United States are also very hawkish on Iraq. What do you think the effect of a U.S. invasion of Iraq would be on Israel's security and spin that out for me? Either one of you.
Mr. Chait: Why don't I do a quick answer first, and then you'll take the rest of the time.
Mr. Pollack: Sure.
Mr. Chait: Quickly, I think it would probably lead to beneficial consequences. The first Arab-Israeli peace process took place after the first Gulf War, and I think there was a clear causality there. The Arab world saw that its most powerful rejectionist force which was Iraq, had been humbled and that the United States was the dominant power in the region and that it didn't have any interest anymore in supporting maximum Palestinian rejectionism, which I think is the main impediment to peace in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein funds suicide bombers, and in many ways encourages Palestinian rejectionism, so with that force wiped out, I think we might well see a positive movement like we saw 10 years before.
Mr. Pollack: My quick answer would be that in terms of the impact on Israel's security, they'll be short term problems and probably long term benefits. And, as far as I can tell, the Israeli's believe the same thing. Just in talking to Israeli officials, not talking about the pro-Israeli lobby here. The Israelis actually would much prefer that the United States turn it's attention to Iran. They see Iran as a much bigger immediate threat to them than Iraq. That said, they do recognize that Iraq is a very important long term threat to them, as well and I think their feeling is that in the short term the Iraqis almost certainly will try to attack them, using terrorism, using whatever conventional means of delivery they have, and at the end of the day, using whatever weapons of mass destruction they have for various motives related to trying to prevent the United States from implementing a war against Israel. But they also recognize that if they can get through that, then they will have removed a major threat, major long term threat to their security and that in the end that will be beneficial because it will also remove another sponsor of the various Palestinian terrorist groups.
Mr. Kuttner: Okay, lots and lots of audience questions, and this is the only one that's typed, so I'm going to begin with this one. Mr. Pollack, in light of your comments on 60 Minutes last night, regarding weapons inspections in Iraq, I have a three part question. One, how many Winnebago's are there in Iraq? Who owns them aside from the weapon's makers? How many centrifuges can you put in the back of a Winnebago? And how many centrifuge Winnebago's would you need for extraction capacity equivalent to a fixed plant?
Mr. Pollack: First, the Winnebago's that I mentioned were specifically in reference to the biological warfare program where the Iraqis have taken mobile biological laboratories and put them in the back of RVs. There are approximately two dozen as far as we know. But, that number is based on somewhat old information. At this point in time there may well be more. As far as the nuclear program is concerned, one of the things that truly astounded intelligence analysts when we started to get defectors from the Iraqi nuclear program is how inefficient the Iraqis were willing to be and how willing they were to compensate for inefficiency with mass. They were able to reduce the size of centrifuges apparently to the size of washing machines. That is not the most efficient way to do things, but if you were determined to do them, you can. You simply need more of them. As far as how many the Iraqis have, we don't know. That's the problem. There is a consensus among the former inspectors that the Iraqis probably are enriching uranium right now. Again, that is what we heard from any number of defectors, at least credible defectors. Obviously we heard all kinds of things from incredible or uncredible defectors, but that's not even worth talking about. But, from credible defectors, we found that the Iraqis were still enriching uranium even at this moment, that they resumed a crash program to do so in 1998, after the inspectors were kicked out. And as I said, we simply do not know how many centrifuges they have going or how far along they are.
Mr. Kuttner: Thank you. We have about five different questions asking whether a double standard is being used relative to Israel, which has nuclear weapons and Iraq. Anybody. Jon.
Mr. Chait: I'll take it.
Audience Member: (Inaudible Phrase) U.N. resolutions as well.
Mr. Chait: Right, the United Nations resolutions against Iraq are of a different quality and a different character than the ones against Israel. The United Nations was at war against Iraq and the resolutions demanding that it disarm were a specific condition for ending the war. There's no similar United Nations resolution against Israel. Furthermore, I'll let Ken add to this answer, but Israel hasn't been regularly launching wars of aggression against it's neighbors.
Mr. Pollack: Just another point about the U.N., I think the most important difference between the U.N. resolutions on Iraq and those against Israel are that most of the resolutions passed against Iraq are under Article 7 of the U.N. Charter, which makes them binding on all members. In the case of the Arab Israeli dispute, I think we can all agree that there have been faults committed on all sides. In the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, its aggression against other countries in the region, its use of weapons of mass destruction, these were all acts of aggression which there was no other side, no other party that was wrong as well. And, as I said, the U.N. recognized that by passing Articles, excuse me, passing resolutions under Article 7, which is categorically different from those passed against Israel.
Mr. Kuttner: Ben Barber.
Mr. Barber: I think implicit in those five questions is probably the question of the United States' even-handedness in the Middle East and the problem there is it's very clear we have more power than this Administration has been willing to use in creating a somewhat more even-handed situation. Sharon has not exported Arafat as he would like to do for the single reason that the United States has told him not to. And it's clear that when the United States is clear with Israel about limits, Israel is willing to observe those limits. So, the question isn't about Israel or evenness in terms of a moral evenness between what's going on there. But, rather the question of whether the United States can create a more balanced and moderate policy and a more effective way out of the current cycle of violence by greater evenhandedness. And, I think the answer is yes, and, I think, on the contrary a war in Iraq is likely to strengthen the sense of a one dimensional non-evenhanded policy that is going to make it more difficult for both Israel and for the United States down the line.
Mr. Kuttner: Bill.
Mr. Pollack: Oh. Thank you. As one who was in the U.S. government throughout the period of the 1990s, we tried any number of times to use those methods. We have no idea where any of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction sites were. This is the problem that we encountered by the mid 1990's was that the Iraqis had gotten so good at hiding and moving their weapons of mass destruction, we just didn't know where they were. Believe me, in 1998, when we launched Operation Desert Fox, if we had known where any of Saddam's weapons were: we would have bombed them. Go back and look at the target list. There were 97 targets struck during Desert Fox, only 10 of them were considered weapons of mass destruction storage or production facilities. And those facilities consisted of things like the sand refurbishment plant which we believe the Iraqis were using to do work on their ballistic missiles. But, it is also a massive sand refurbishment plant. We don't know where their primary ballistic missile work is being done; this is the problem that we have. If we could find these things, we could bomb them. But, the problem we have is we can't find them and we couldn't find them when the inspectors were in there on the ground and we couldn't find them after the inspectors left, and we don't know where they are today.
Mr. Kuttner: Bill.
Mr. Galston: I was just nodding my head, because I think that's exactly right.
Mr. Kuttner: Oh, I'm sorry.
Mr. Barber: Because I think that's exactly right. But, let me just say though, this is like when you go to buy a car and when you're talking to the salesman he tells you it's the greatest car you ever bought and then you go to service it the first time and the guy says "What a piece of crap this is, you know, this is really bad." Technology's that way, when it comes to offensive war, we are told that our technology and our smart bombs are more advanced than ever before, it's gonna' do a job this time that it apparently didn't do last time and that technology can do it all. But, then when it comes to the other side, you know, the peaceful uses of technology, "Oh, it's overrated, it can't do what it says it's going to do." I suspect, I don't know this, I'm not an expert in the area, I suspect they're right. Technology can generally do a whole lot less than we think it can do, and in war time it generally does a whole lot less. But, I wish that argument was applied to those who think the application of smart bombs and smart weapons is gonna' make this a costless war and we're gonna' hit all the right targets and we're gonna' minimize cost to our own troops and friendly fire, and so forth. Because the fact is we've been promised that every time and it's been far, far more costly for exactly the reasons that we get when we talk about these peaceful uses and say "Yeah, well the technology isn't really gonna' do the job that it's cracked up to do," so a little more consistency there might help us understand why war is always more costly than the technicians tell us it's going to be when they promise us new smart weapons and new smart bombs.
Mr. Kuttner: Jon, come back.
Mr. Chait: Well, actually the… (break in tape)
Mr. Kuttner: …in post war Afghanistan and 7 years out the inability to establish full fledged democracy in the Balkans, why do pro-war advocates believe we can impose democracy on Iraq, especially since an American-supported ruler will be seen as illegitimate?
Mr. Pollack: Why don't you go first?
Mr. Pollack: First, I wouldn't assume that any government that follows Saddam Hussein will be seen as legitimate. As I indicated earlier, I think it depends entirely on how the United States goes about the reconstruction. I certainly do agree with the premise of the question, which is that I think the United States has done a terrible job in Afghanistan. And I actually think that this is one of the most important points that our adversarys raised, which is, given how the Bush Administration has handled in Afghanistan, why should we be confident that they're going to do better this time around in Iraq? What I will say is I do, I work very closely actually with various agencies of the U.S. government on exactly those issues right now. I've been working a great deal with them, and what I will say is that some of them do seem to have the right answer. And do seem to recognize that this is going to be a long term commitment: that it has to be a matter of building democracy and rebuilding Iraq's economy over the long term. That it needs to be a U.N. and internationally-led effort. That the United States can't simply go in and impose it's peace on the, on the country, that that will likely back fire on us. Unfortunately, that's not yet the consensus view in the Bush Administration. I am hopeful that it will prevail and again I'll come back to the earlier point that I made which is that while we tend to paint these guys as being loose cannons and hell bent on doing what they want. They actually have shown themselves to be sensitive to public opinion, to the opinion of the Congress, and to the opinion of our Allies. And, my hope is that by appearing in venues like this, and by talking to Congressmen, and talking for foreign diplomats, all of which I do, all of which I know my colleagues do, that we will help influence the Administration and make very clear to them that if we are going to invade Iraq, we cannot afford to treat it as we have Afghanistan.
Mr. Kuttner: Any response on that?
Mr. Pollack: I'll take this opportunity to respond to a couple of things that our opponents have said. First of all, to characterize this as a war about nonproliferation, I think is beside the manner. You know, Ben Barber laid out a number of propositions about how the United States ought to pay much more attention to nonproliferation policy. I agree with all of them. I don't think any of them addresses the problem of Iraq. Let me come to the second point, which would get to Mr. Galston's points about why you want to, why we should remove Saddam Hussein. The reason for removing Saddam Hussein from power, the reason that Saddam Hussein is uniquely threatening, the reason that Saddam Hussein is not Israel or France or India or any other country that has obtained nuclear weapons or is seeking to obtain nuclear weapons is because of Saddam's record in power, because of what we know about his thinking. This does make Saddam Hussein uniquely dangerous. I do not know of another leader in power who thinks the way that Saddam Hussein does. We have 34 years of experience with this man. He is a constant aggressor, he is a wild miscalculator, he is consistently willing to try to absorb massive amounts of damage to his own society in the expectation that he can absorb, he is willing to tolerate more damage than his opponent. He has embarked on numerous miscalculations. He has engaged in numerous miscalculations, which have led him to embark on what should have been suicidal foreign policy adventures, which resulted in the loss of many lives, both in his own country and in neighboring countries. The reason Saddam was able to survive all of those miscalculations has been based on sheer luck. But of course Saddam ascribes it to his own innate genius and his historical destiny. A destiny which not only includes dominating the Persian Gulf, becoming the ruler of the Arab world, but also landing some great blow at Israel. And now, since the Gulf War, also getting his revenge at the United States. And finally just to sum up, what we know about Saddam Hussein's thinking about nuclear weapons is categorically different from what we know about the thinking of other leaders. And what we knew, or what we now know about the thinking of the Soviet leaders, which is that Saddam believes that nuclear weapons will not simply be in a defensive advantage for him. That is, that they will protect him against foreign threats, but that they will be an offensive advantage. Because he believes that once he has acquired nuclear weapons, the United States, and for that matter Israel, will be deterred. That we will not dare to try to stop him if he embarks on new aggression in the region, blackmailing countries around him, attacking them, whatever it is he wants to do. Remember, in 1991, we went to work with Iraq because of the threat that Iraq constituted to the Persian Gulf region. And another issue that needs to be on the national agenda is why is it that we've allowed ourselves to remain so dependent on Persian Gulf oil? Why is it that the world has remained so dependent on fossil fuels? I think that ought to be also put to the Bush Administration but that's not a topic of this debate unfortunately.
Mr. Kuttner: Let me summarize several questions to close with one last question. The Bush Administration's Iraq policy has been referred to as a Weapon of Mass Distraction from the War on Terrorism. We only touched on this very briefly, so I wonder what both sides would have to say about the relationship between war with Iraq, either in terms of a diversion of resources or in terms of stoking the hatred of anti American fundamentalists around the world. What is the connection between or, conversely, the possible relationship between Saddam and Al Qaida? What's the relationship between the War on Terrorism and the possible war on Iraq?
Mr. Galston: Well, I've already spoken to that. The War on Terrorism is the more immediate and the more important war and given the fact that he himself recommended that the War on Terrorism make much more progress before we even consider seriously a war on Iraq, he must believe, as I do, that there is some tension between those two efforts that is more than rhetorical. With regard to the second point, I believe and I think Mr. Pollack believes, although I'm not sure Mr. Chait believes, that what comes after the war and in particular our policy crucially effects our judgment about the advisability of the war itself. And here is the question. Is any post-war Iraq preferable to the status quo, which seems to be the position that Mr. Chait took. Or are there some outcomes in, of a post-war Iraq that would be, to quote Mr. Pollack, "a disaster." Uh, I incline to the latter view and therefore it makes a difference whether this is the Bush Administration's war or whether it's the New Republic's war if the Bush Administration is not appropriately committed to Mr. Pollack's post-war Iraqi regime. Which I believe it is not. Third, there is an alternative to a policy of invasion. It is called, or I will call it, Deterrence Plus. There is evidence that Saddam Hussein can be deterred, as he was against the use of chemical and biological weapons in Desert Storm and as he was against the renewed threat of invading Kuwait in the 1990's. The plus is both maintaining the No Fly Zones and maintaining maximum pressure domestically and internationally, internally and externally to thwart the development. (Pause on tape)
Mr. Chait: On a couple of occasions it has been asked, isn't it a problem if Saddam Hussein acquires nuclear weapons and his answer both those times has essentially been to point to other countries which don't fulfill the conditions that we've laid out that make a nuclear Iraq uniquely dangerous. And, I think that lack of grappling with the problem of Iraq as opposed to diverting the question to other counties is a fatal flaw in his analysis. As for Mr. Galston, I'm not really sure precisely where we disagree, except for in our view of what's going to happen in the future. He's admitted that the only way we've gotten to the current state of having tough or hopefully tough U.N. inspections is by the threat of American unilateral war. So, what do we think is going to happen going forward? In the past we have a fairly test good case, which is Iraqi refusal to comply with UNSCO, the prior weapons inspectors and here it wasn't a case of Iraq refusing to dot the I's or cross t's. It was making repeated massive violations of the inspections. The sort of material breach that he outlined is the kind of thing that Iraq did every single day and our Allies had absolutely no objection to any of these. Not only did they not see them as a justification for all out war, but they didn't even see them as a justification for a scolding United Nations resolution or a pin prick bombing. So I think we need to sort of recalibrate in the view of history what we think is going to happen. I think pretty clearly, Saddam Hussein is not going to make tiny picayune, insignificant violations of the inspectors, but I think he's going to make sustained important ones. And, probably our Allies are going to look for every excuse to let him get away with it unless they think that we are going to go to war otherwise. So the only way to keep our Allies in line and to keep Saddam Hussein in line is the threat of war. And if Saddam Hussein does make these violations, which I think historically is very hard to dispute, I think we have to admit the only way to keep him from obtaining nuclear weapons and starting another war is to go to war ourselves.
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